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Values in Science: The Case
of Scientific Collaboration
Kristina Rolin*y
Much of the literature on values in science is limited in its perspective because it focuses
on the role of values in individual scientists’ decision making, thereby ignoring the
context of scientific collaboration. I examine the epistemic structure of scientific col-
laboration and argue that it gives rise to two arguments showing that moral and social
values can legitimately play a role in scientists’ decision to accept something as sci-
entific knowledge. In the case of scientific collaboration some moral and social values
are properly understood to be extrinsic epistemic values, that is, values that promote the
attainment of scientific knowledge.
1. Introduction. Much of the literature on values in science focuses on the
role of values in individual scientists’ decision making, thereby ignoring the
context of scientific collaboration (see, e.g., Machamer and Wolters 2004;
Kincaid, Dupré, andWylie 2007; Carrier, Howard, and Kourany 2008). Yet,
many scientists work in research teams and publish their findings in multi-
authored articles (Wray 2002, 2006; Galison 2003). Scientific collabora-
tion is often a practical necessity because the production and analysis of evi-
dence are too expensive and time-consuming for any individual scientist
to accomplish independently (Hardwig 1991; Wagenknecht 2013). Some-
times collaboration becomes a necessity because a research project draws on
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a variety of expertise from different disciplines (Thagard 1999; Andersen
and Wagenknecht 2013). In such cases, a research team with a division of
labor is capable of carrying out a project that no individual scientist could do
on their own.
Acknowledging the importance of scientific collaboration has led many
philosophers to examine its implications for the social epistemology of sci-
entific knowledge. Some philosophers suggest that scientific knowledge
emerging in collaborations involves collective beliefs or acceptances (Gil-
bert 2000; Bouvier 2004; Wray 2006, 2007b; Staley 2007; Andersen 2010;
Rolin 2010; Cheon 2014). Some others suggest that the epistemic structure
of scientific collaboration is based on relations of trust and interactions
among scientists (Hardwig 1991; Kusch 2002; Thagard 2010; Fagan 2011,
2012; Andersen and Wagenknecht 2013; de Ridder 2013; Frost-Arnold
2013; Wagenknecht 2013, 2014). In the former case, a research team is
thought to arrive at a group view that is not fully reducible to individual
views. In the latter case, each team member is thought to rely on testimonial
knowledge that is based on her trusting other team members. These two
models are not competing accounts of the epistemic structure of scientific
collaboration. Sometimes scientific knowledge in collaborations takes the
form of collective acceptance, sometimes it is an outcome of trust-based
acceptance, and at other times it takes some other form.1
In this paper I examine the implications of scientific collaboration for the
debate concerning the proper role of moral and social values in science.
Much of the debate is focused on the ideal of value-free science, the view
that non-epistemic values are not allowed to intrude the decision-making
processes that scientists are engaged in when they accept something as
scientific knowledge. Acceptance is thought to involve a judgment that a
hypothesis or a theory is sufficiently well supported that it does not need to
be submitted to further investigation for the moment (Lacey 1999, 13).2 A
number of philosophers argue that the value-free ideal is not feasible—or
even if it is feasible under some specific circumstances, there is no reason to
1. There is a controversy over the question of whether a collective belief (Gilbert 2000) is
properly understood to be a belief or an acceptance. While the belief/acceptance dis-
tinction is not clear-cut, beliefs are often seen as involuntary and acceptances as volun-
tary states (Elliott and Willmes 2013, 811). I use the term “collective acceptance” to
acknowledge that a research group’s adopting a collective view is typically done volun-
tarily (Häkli 2006) and as a means of realizing the group’s epistemic goals (Wray 2001).
2. My definition of the value-free ideal differs from Hugh Lacey’s thesis of impartiality
in that the requirement of value freedom is applied not only to the appraisal of ac-
ceptability but also to what Lacey calls the adoption of strategy (2005, 979). While
impartiality proposes that a hypothesis or a theory is acceptable if and only if it manifests
epistemic values highly in light of available evidence, the strategies adopted prior to
acceptance may be socially value-laden (2005, 980).
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adopt it as a criterion of good science (Longino 1990, 1995; Root 1993;
Lacey 1999; Kitcher 2001, 2011; Solomon 2001; Douglas 2009; Kourany
2010). Arguments against the ideal are advanced in tandem with case stud-
ies where moral and social values are claimed to play a legitimate role in
acceptance (see Anderson 1995, 2004; Douglas 2000; Intemann 2001; Rich-
ardson 2010; Crasnow 2014; Elliott and McKaughan 2014). While I do not
object to all such arguments, I wish to challenge the assumption that all moral
and social values are non-epistemic values and that, consequently, all cases
where moral and social values legitimately enter into a decision to accept
something count as arguments against the value-free ideal.
I argue that in the context of scientific collaboration somemoral and social
values are properly understood to be epistemic rather than non-epistemic
values. By epistemic values I mean values that promote the attainment of
truth, either intrinsically or extrinsically. As Daniel Steel explains, an epi-
stemic value is intrinsic when manifesting that value constitutes an attain-
ment of or is necessary for truth, and it is extrinsic when it promotes the at-
tainment of truth without itself being an indicator or a requirement of truth
(2010, 18). For a value to promote the attainment of truth may mean that
it leads scientists to support social arrangements that are instrumental in the
epistemic success of science. For example, diversity is an extrinsic epistemic
value insofar as it leads scientists to cultivate a diversity of perspectives,
and this in turn facilitates transformative criticism in scientific communities
(Longino 2002, 131).While moral and social values are not epistemic values
intrinsically, they can be argued to be extrinsic epistemic values on the
grounds that they lead scientists to act in ways that are conducive to truth.
In order to explain how the group perspective on values in science differs
from the individual one, in section 2 I present a review of three well-known
arguments against the value-free ideal: (1) an argument from pluralism with
respect to epistemic values, (2) an argument from inductive risk, and (3) an
argument from value-laden background assumptions. These arguments are
built on slightly different yet overlapping analyses of what it means for a
scientist to accept a hypothesis or a theory and how non-epistemic values
can play a legitimate role in acceptance, which is thought to be a core ep-
istemic moment in scientific inquiry. While the analysis of acceptance un-
derlying these three arguments is complex, acceptance in this sense can be
attributed to individual scientists and research teams alike. This analysis of
acceptance does not do justice to scientific collaboration because it neglects
epistemically significant differences between individual and collective ac-
ceptance, on the one hand, and between individual scientists relying and not
relying on testimony, on the other hand.
In section 3 I review three normative views that have been proposed
as alternatives to the value-free ideal. Miriam Solomon’s social empiricism
builds on the argument from pluralism with respect to epistemic values,
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Heather Douglas’s conception of scientific integrity on the inductive risk
argument, and Helen Longino’s social account of objectivity on the argu-
ment from value-laden background assumptions. In these three views, the
value-free ideal is replaced with guidelines and norms addressed either to
individual scientists or to scientific communities.While the three views offer
important insights concerning the proper role of values in science, they
ignore an intermediate social level in science: scientific collaboration.3
In sections 4 and 5 I introduce a more social analysis of acceptance than
the one revealed in section 2. A more social analysis can be found in the two
models of understanding the epistemic structure of scientific collaboration:
collective acceptance and trust-based acceptance. I identify the moral and
social values that can play a legitimate role in collective and trust-based
acceptance. I argue that in the context of scientific collaboration these moral
and social values should be understood as extrinsic epistemic values because
they promote the attainment of truth.
2. Three Arguments against the Value-Free Ideal. When one argues
against the value-free ideal, it is not sufficient to show that scientific re-
search sometimes fails to be value-free. One has to show also that the ideal
in itself is not feasible—or even if it is feasible under some circumstances,
there are reasons that speak against its adoption as a standard of good sci-
ence. In this section I review three arguments aiming to do so.While the plau-
sibility of these arguments depends on case studies, I leave case studies aside
and focus on analyzing the conception of acceptance underlying the three ar-
guments. The conception of acceptance is of interest here because scientific
collaboration will urge philosophers to rethink acceptance in science.
2.1. Argument from Pluralism with Respect to Epistemic Values. A
number of philosophers argue that the value-free ideal is not attainable be-
cause the set of epistemic values includes a variety of criteria and desiderata
that cannot be realized at the same time, and non-epistemic values can legit-
imately play a role in determining which epistemic values scientists em-
phasize when they evaluate theories (Kuhn 1977; Rooney 1992; Kitcher
1993; Longino 1995; Solomon 2001; Elliott 2013; Elliott and McKaughan
2014). Arguments aiming to undermine the value-free ideal by drawing at-
tention to the plurality of epistemic values follow two strategies. One strategy
aims to show that the plurality of epistemic values is a consequence of the
plurality of epistemic goals when the goals are taken to be either significant
truths (Kitcher 1993; Anderson 1995) or empirical successes (Solomon 2001).
3. Philip Kitcher’s (2001, 2011) well-ordered science and Janet Kourany’s (2010) ideal
of socially responsible science are also alternatives to the value-free ideal. I postpone a
discussion of their views to another occasion.
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Another strategy suggests that the plurality of epistemic values is revealed by
studying actual practices of science. For example, ThomasKuhn (1977) claims
that the five epistemic values of accuracy, consistency, simplicity, breadth of
scope, and fruitfulness have played a role in theory choice throughout the his-
tory of physics. Longino (1995) adds to this list six other values that, she ar-
gues, can be called epistemic on equally good grounds: empirical adequacy,
novelty, ontological heterogeneity, complexity of interaction, applicability to
human needs, and diffusion of power.
These arguments are based on an analysis of acceptance as a particular
kind of value judgment. In this analysis, acceptance consists of two mo-
ments, “valuing” and “evaluation” (McMullin 1983, 5). “Valuing” is about
choosing which epistemic values are applied in a particular decision-
making situation, and “evaluation” is about assessing the extent to which a
theory realizes the chosen epistemic values. Non-epistemic values can legit-
imately play a role in “valuing” because in this role they are thought to be
epistemically harmless or even beneficial if they contribute to an efficient
division of research efforts in scientific communities (Kitcher 1993; Solo-
mon 2001). But non-epistemic values are not allowed to play a role in “eval-
uation.” Next, I turn to an argument from inductive risk that suggests that
“evaluation” cannot always be value-free either.
2.2. Argument from Inductive Risk. A number of philosophers argue
that the value-free ideal is not feasible because non-epistemic values have a
legitimate role to play in the evaluation of risks involved in acceptance
(Douglas 2000, 2007, 2009; Wilholt 2009; Steel 2010, 2013; Elliott 2011;
Biddle 2013; Brown 2013). The most often cited version of the inductive
risk argument can be found in Richard Rudner’s 1953 article titled “The
Scientist qua Scientist Makes Value Judgments.” One premise in Rudner’s
argument is the view that a scientist as scientist accepts or rejects hypoth-
eses and that acceptance involves uncertainty (1953, 2). In accepting a hy-
pothesis, a scientist has to decide whether the evidence at hand is suffi-
ciently strong to warrant the acceptance. This decision, Rudner argues,
depends on the risks involved. If a scientist accepts a false hypothesis, there
may be a cost associated with this type of error. In addition, if she rejects a
true hypothesis, there may be another cost associated with the other type of
error. The key premise in Rudner’s argument is that the assessment of the
costs involved in these two mistakes is a matter of moral value judgment
(1953, 3).
It is important to notice that Rudner’s argument builds on a “thick” con-
ception of acceptance. Given this conception, acceptance involves three
moments: the assessment of the evidential warrant of a hypothesis, the iden-
tification of error-related risks, and a moral value judgment concerning an
acceptable level of risk. Thus, if one endorses a thick conception of accep-
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tance, then the value-free ideal is not attainable because one moment in ac-
ceptance involves non-epistemic values. While some philosophers are crit-
ical of Rudner’s conception of acceptance (Jeffrey 1956; Hempel 1981; Mc-
Mullin 1983; Lacey 1999, 2005; Mitchell 2004), those who defend it argue
that it is more relevant to the actual practice of science than a thin concep-
tion, which involves merely the assessment of the evidential warrant of a hy-
pothesis (Douglas 2000, 2007; Biddle 2013; Steel 2013). Next, I discuss yet
another well-known argument against the value-free ideal.
2.3. Argument from Value-Laden Background Assumptions. A number
of philosophers argue that the value-free ideal is not feasible because non-
epistemic values can legitimately influence the choice of background as-
sumptions that play a role in a scientist’s decision to accept a hypothesis
(Longino 1990, 2002; Anderson 1995, 2004; Intemann 2001, 2005; Haw-
thorne 2010; Richardson 2010; Clough 2011; de Melo-Martín and Inte-
mann 2012). For example, Longino argues that background assumptions
are needed to establish the relevance of empirical evidence to a hypothesis
or a theory (1990, 43–44; 2002, 127). While background assumptions may
not always “encode” social values, they often do so (1990, 216). Value-
laden background assumptions should not be judged as necessarily “bad”
science because it is difficult to see how evidential reasoning could proceed
without them (1990, 128 and 216). Whether value-laden background as-
sumptions are acceptable or not will depend on a community practice where
they are critically evaluated and either defended, modified, or rejected in
response to criticism (1990, 73–74).
Let me summarize the three arguments I have reviewed in this section.
The first argument constructs acceptance as a value judgment that includes
both valuing and evaluation. Non-epistemic values can legitimately play a
role in the valuing of certain epistemic values. The second argument sug-
gests that the evaluation of empirical adequacy is a more complex affair
than merely determining the degree of evidential warrant. When a scientist
evaluates a hypothesis, she is expected to identify error-related risks and to
make a moral judgment of their seriousness. The third argument reveals yet
another dimension in the structure of acceptance. When a scientist evaluates
a hypothesis, she makes value-laden judgments concerning the plausibility
of particular background assumptions. Whereas the second argument is for-
ward looking in the sense that a scientist is expected to reflect on the con-
sequences of her decision to accept something as scientific knowledge, the
third argument is backward looking in the sense that acceptance is thought
to build on an existing body of scientific research providing background as-
sumptions for evidential reasoning.
The analysis of acceptance underlying the three arguments is social in the
sense that it draws attention to the context of scientific reasoning. The first
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argument draws attention to the context of particular epistemic values, the
second argument to the context-dependent consequences of accepting a
hypothesis, and the third argument to context-dependent background as-
sumptions. Yet, it is important to notice that acceptance, as it is analyzed in
the three arguments, can be attributed to individuals and research teams
alike. In sections 4 and 5 I argue that in order to do justice to scientific
collaboration, we need an analysis of acceptance that is more social than the
one revealed in this section.
3. Three Normative Approaches to Values in Science. So far I have shown
that there are reasons to believe that the value-free ideal is not feasible
independently of whether acceptance is attributed to individual scientists or
research teams. Thus, it is appropriate to discuss some normative approaches
that have been proposed as alternatives to the value-free ideal. Interestingly,
the alternative normative approaches offer guidance not only for individual
scientists but also for scientific communities. Yet, I argue that such guidance
does not meet the challenges posed by scientific collaboration.
3.1. Social Empiricism. Solomon’s social empiricism gives recommen-
dations for individual scientists and science policy makers (2001, 150). In her
view, non-epistemic values can legitimately play a role in determining which
empirical successes a scientist considers most important when she decides to
work with a particular scientific theory. Solomon thinks that non-epistemic
values can play an epistemically beneficial role in science insofar as they gen-
erate and maintain an efficient distribution of research efforts among those the-
ories that have some empirical successes. Such a distribution, she argues, is
a prerequisite to the long-term epistemic success of science. For this reason, a
normative approach to values in science should not discourage the influence
of non-epistemic values at the individual level in determining a scientist’s
choice of one theory over another (2001, 120). Solomon’s main concern
is the proper functioning of scientific communities. She recommends that
science policy makers take steps to cultivate diversity and dissent in scien-
tific communities (2001, 117–18). As they cannot know in advance which
research programs will be fruitful, they are better off distributing their
bets among several alternative lines of inquiry.
3.2. Scientific Integrity. While the term “policy” is mentioned ex-
plicitly in the title of Douglas’s book Science, Policy, and the Value-Free
Ideal, her main goal is to give advice not for policy makers but for indi-
vidual scientists (2009, 19). In her view, scientific integrity consists in keep-
ing non-epistemic values to their proper roles in scientific reasoning (2009,
88; see also 156 and 176). In order to define their proper roles, Douglas
makes a distinction between a direct and an indirect role. Values play a di-
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rect role when they act as reasons in themselves to accept a hypothesis
or a theory and an indirect role when they act as reasons to accept a cer-
tain level of uncertainty (2009, 96). While non-epistemic values are not al-
lowed to play a direct role in scientific reasoning, they can legitimately play
an indirect one. A direct role is not acceptable because it means that non-
epistemic values play the same role as evidence does (2009, 156). An indirect
role, on the other hand, is acceptable because scientists are morally respon-
sible for their knowledge claims and the predictable consequences of mak-
ing such claims (2009, 106). As Douglas herself admits, her normative ap-
proach is meant to define a minimal criterion for good scientific practice
rather than defend principles for an epistemically ideal community. Given
that scientific integrity is a minimal criterion, an individual scientist can
try to realize it even in a community that is less than ideal from an epistemic
point of view. Next, I turn to an approach that is concerned not only with
individual responsibilities but also with communities.
3.3. Social Account of Objectivity. In Longino’s (1990, 2002) view,
non-epistemic values can legitimately play a role in a scientist’s choice of
background assumptions as long as no one has challenged these assump-
tions. Individual scientists are not held responsible for policing the role of
non-epistemic values in scientific inquiry on their own. Such a responsi-
bility would be too demanding because “there are no formal rules, guide-
lines, or processes that can guarantee that social values will not permeate
evidential relations” (2002, 50). An individual scientist may not even be
aware that her preferred background assumptions resonate with certain non-
epistemic values (1990, 80). For these reasons, a social account of objec-
tivity is needed to make sure that value-laden background assumptions can
be identified and criticized.
Like Solomon, Longino is concerned with the proper functioning of sci-
entific communities. A social account of objectivity is the view that sci-
entific knowledge is objective to the degree that a relevant scientific com-
munity satisfies the four norms of public venues, uptake of criticism, shared
standards, and tempered equality of intellectual authority (1990, 76–81;
2002, 129–31). Yet, Longino’s approach differs from Solomon’s in that it
does not assume that scientific communities are capable of realizing the
normative ideal without assigning responsibilities to individual scientists.
For example, the norm of uptake means that an individual scientist has an
obligation to respond to criticism.
Let me wrap up my findings. While these three accounts address both
individual scientists and scientific communities, they all neglect an inter-
mediate social level in science: research groups. The guidelines and norms
they offer are meant to be valid independently of whether scientists work
without or within research groups. In both cases an individual scientist
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is expected to work with empirically successful theories (Solomon 2001)
and acknowledge her moral responsibility for error-related risks (Douglas
2009). In both cases she has certain obligations in virtue of being a member
of a scientific community (Longino 1990, 2002). Clearly, the term “social”
in Solomon’s and Longino’s social epistemologies means that their epis-
temologies are concerned with scientific communities, not with research
groups. It is time to turn to the epistemic structure of scientific collabora-
tion, which gives rise to a more social analysis of acceptance than the one
we have seen so far.
4. Values in Collective Acceptance. While there is a growing amount of
literature on the role of collective acceptance and trust in science, this
literature has not yet been explored in connection with the debate on the
proper role of values in science. The literature on collective acceptance aims
to understand community-wide scientific changes (Gilbert 2000; Andersen
2010), expert advisory committees (Beatty 2006), and scientific manifestos
(Bouvier 2004). The literature on trust aims to account for the role of moral
virtues in science (Hardwig 1991), the epistemic importance of gender and
race equality in science (Rolin 2002; Wray 2007a), and relations between
scientific and lay communities (Grasswick 2010; Anderson 2011). In this
section I discuss the role of values in collective acceptance, and in the next
section I discuss the role of values in trust-based acceptance. I argue that
insofar as collective acceptance and trust-based acceptance play an epi-
stemic role in science, some moral and social values can play a legitimate
role in acceptance. While moral and social values are often seen as non-
epistemic values, these particular moral and social values are extrinsic ep-
istemic values.
4.1. Plural Subject Account of Collective Acceptance. A number of
philosophers use Margaret Gilbert’s plural subject account of collective
belief to understand collective acceptance in science (Wray 2001, 2007b;
Bouvier 2004; Beatty 2006; Häkli 2006; Staley 2007; Andersen 2010;
Rolin 2010). On such an account, a group of scientists accepts a view in-
sofar as the group members are jointly committed to accepting the view as
a body (Gilbert 2000, 39). To claim that a group accepts a view in this sense
is not the same thing as to claim that all or most group members accept the
view. It is possible that a group accepts a view that all or some group
members do not accept as their personal view. It is not, of course, common
in scientific collaborations that a group’s collective view and group mem-
bers’ personal views are in conflict; otherwise, group members would
hardly consider collaboration as an attractive option for them. But it is im-
portant to notice that in principle an individual scientist’s personal and
collective views can diverge, and they sometimes do (Beatty 2006; Staley
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2007). A scientist can let a particular view stand as the group’s position
even when she has some reservations or doubts concerning it.
Given Gilbert’s account of collective acceptance, moral and social values
are built into the very structure of collective acceptance. As Gilbert explains
it, a group’s joint commitment to accept a view as a body generates ob-
ligations for group members (2000, 44). Once a group member has openly
expressed a commitment to jointly accept a view as the position of the
group, she is obliged not to question the group view publicly. In some re-
search groups an individual scientist may ask that her name be removed
from the list of authors if she does not personally agree with the argument in
the joint paper and is not willing to let the argument stand as the position of
the group. But when she signs a joint paper, her act is usually taken to mean
that she has expressed a commitment to jointly accept the content of the
paper, knowing that such a commitment generates obligations. While an
obligation to accept the group view is not universal in the way that some
moral obligations are, it is nevertheless of moral and social nature because it
is based on an agreement among group members. Therefore, a joint com-
mitment provides group members with a moral and social reason for as-
serting and supporting a view (see also Mathiesen 2006, 169).
Thus, if collective acceptance is allowed to play an epistemic role in
science, then a moral and social reason is allowed to play a role in accep-
tance. Such a reason is a scientist’s commitment to carry on the collabo-
ration even when it means that she has to suppress some of her personal
views temporarily. While such a strong commitment to collaboration may
seem to be irrational from an epistemic point of view, I argue that it is not
necessarily so.
4.2. Group versus Individual Justification. A common assumption is
that a group’s joint commitment to accept a view as a body is not effective in
getting at truth (Goldman 2004; Mathiesen 2006). This assumption, I argue,
is false. From an individual point of view it may seem to be epistemically
irrational to accept a view on the grounds that other group members accept
it and one has promised to be loyal to the group. From the point of view of
the group, however, the situation is different. As with individual scientists,
research groups are also expected to provide epistemic justification for their
views. Groups and individuals are not different in this respect. However,
group justification differs from individual justification in that it involves
not merely reasoning but also an aggregation procedure. By an aggregation
procedure I mean a mechanism for aggregating group members’ individ-
ual views into corresponding collective views endorsed by the group as a
whole. Whereas valid reasoning is likely to lead an individual to accept a
consistent set of views, it is not sufficient for a group to arrive at a consistent
set of collective views. As Christian List and Philip Pettit (2011) argue, a
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group has to settle on an aggregation procedure (or some other type of
decision-making procedure) in order to achieve a consistent set of collective
views. Let me explain the argument in more detail.
Let us assume that a group G includes three persons, A, B, and C, and that
each member of the group is competent in deductive reasoning. Let us as-
sume also that the task at hand is to find out whether group G is justified in
believing that (p & q) is true given that each group member has already
made her individual judgments concerning the truth values of p and q. For
example, if each group member believes that p is true and q is true, then
each group member is justified in believing that (p & q) is true. In this case
it does not make a difference whether the group decides to aggregate indi-
vidual judgments concerning the premises or the conclusions. In both cases,
group G is justified in believing that (p & q) is true. However, the situation
is more complex when the group members disagree about the premises
but nevertheless want to arrive at a collective view. Let us assume that A
believes that p is true and q is false, B believes that p is false and q is true,
and C believes that both p and q are true. It follows that both A and B are
justified in believing that (p & q) is false and C is justified in believing that
(p& q) is true. Thus, group G seems to be justified in believing that (p& q)
is false when it chooses to aggregate individual conclusions by means of a
majority vote. Also, group G seems to be justified in believing that p and q
are true when it chooses to aggregate individual premises by means of a
majority vote. This is because two group members, A and C, believe that p
is true and two group members, B and C, believe that q is true. The trou-
bling upshot is that group G seems to be justified in believing an incon-
sistent set of propositions: p, q, and not (p & q).
The abstract nature of the judgment aggregation problem has led some
philosophers to question its relevance to scientific knowledge (Magnus
2013). Yet, I argue that there is at least one practical lesson research groups
can learn from the problem. In order to block the possibility of inconsistent
collective views, research groups need to “collectivize reason” (Pettit 2003,
176) by settling on an aggregation procedure (or another type of decision-
making procedure). The reason for this is that consistency in a set of views
is a necessary condition of having justified views, for both individuals and
groups. Scientific publications are expected to be consistent independently
of whether they are authored by individuals or groups (Rolin 2010, 220).
Given the need to “collectivize reason” in research groups, a strong com-
mitment to scientific collaboration is epistemically rational because it en-
ables the group to steer clear of inconsistent collective views. Also, a group’s
decision to follow a particular aggregation procedure requires a joint com-
mitment on behalf of its members. Whereas group members can conduct
reasoning individually, the aggregation of individual views into a collec-
tive view cannot be done individually. It has to be done by the group jointly
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as a body. This is the case even when one group member is chosen as the
lead author who is in charge of compiling individual contributions into a
consistent manuscript. The other group members need to recognize the au-
thority of the lead author, and they are asked to give their approval to the
final outcome of the writing process. Thus, the moral and social values gen-
erated by a joint commitment are extrinsic epistemic values because they are
conducive to internal consistency, and internal consistency is an intrinsic
epistemic value because it is a necessary condition for truth (see, e.g., Steel
2010, 18).
4.3. Objections and Replies. So far I have argued that a joint com-
mitment to accept an aggregation procedure and its outcome is epistemi-
cally rational insofar as it enables a group to avoid inconsistency. It is im-
portant to keep in mind also that when scientists work in research groups
they can achieve more ambitious epistemic goals than they could if they
were working on their own. Collaboration may sometimes require an indi-
vidual to make a compromise, but the compromise is balanced by the ep-
istemic benefits of collaboration (Fallis 2006; Wray 2006). Next, I wish to
eliminate two objections that may be raised against my argument.
One objection is that there is no need to enforce an internally consistent
collective view by means of judgment aggregation procedures if the group
members take their time to deliberate on their views. Given enough time
and resources, disagreements among group members will be ironed out and
the group will arrive at a collective view that is not only internally consis-
tent but also the personal view of each group member.4 In this case, the
group’s view can be understood in a summative way. On a summative ac-
count, the group accepts a view if and only if all or most group members
accept the view (Gilbert 2000, 37). A summative account of group view in
itself does not import moral and social values into acceptance because it
does not involve the notion of joint commitment.
Against this objection I argue that group deliberation is not a feasible
ideal in all areas of contemporary science. Kent Staley (2007) argues that
deliberation is difficult to implement in very large research groups, which
can be found in some areas of physics. Such groups can include up to 300 or
even 400 scientists. Large research groups need to strike a balance between
two aims. On the one hand, they seek to avoid making false claims, and on
the other, they seek to make novel and significant true claims (Staley 2007,
323). The pressure to publish novel and significant results means that there
4. Solomon (2006) argues that an aggregation procedure is to be preferred to group
deliberation because the latter can give rise to the phenomenon of groupthink. However,
there is a controversy over the question whether groupthink is a problem in research
teams (Tollefsen 2006; Wylie 2006; Wray 2014).
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is an incentive to aggregate individual views into a collective view even
when it means that some group members’ personal views are dismissed
for the moment. As Staley explains, there has to be a willingness to make
compromises between the individual group members’ personal views and
the collective statement of the group (2007, 324).
Another objection to my argument is that the moral and social obligations
generated by a joint commitment cannot be epistemically rational because
they are likely to suppress dissent in research groups, and dissent is epi-
stemically beneficial, as Solomon (2001) argues (see sec. 3). While I grant
that dissent is an epistemic resource in scientific communities (see also
Zollman 2010; Fehr 2011; Intemann 2011; Rolin 2011), I argue that im-
posing epistemic conformity in research groups is not a problem as long as
it is balanced by a reasonable amount of dissent in scientific communities.
Acknowledging the epistemic importance of dissent does not undermine my
argument; instead, it supports the view that there is an asymmetry between
the social epistemology of research groups and the social epistemology of
scientific communities. Whereas research groups are expected to speak as
if they have one voice, scientific communities are not expected to do so.
One might even argue that insofar as large-scale collaborations are becom-
ing a rule rather than an exception, philosophers should be increasingly con-
cerned with the question of how diversity of perspectives and dissent are
maintained in scientific communities.
Having countered the two objections, I conclude that a particular moral
and social value can play a legitimate role in acceptance if acceptance is
understood to involve not only individual but also collective acceptance.
The moral and social value is an obligation that group members have in
virtue of their joint commitment to let a particular view stand as the position
of the group. I do not claim that all group views involve a joint commitment
on behalf of group members. In some cases, a summative account of group
views will probably be satisfactory. But I do claim that in some other cases,
a collective account of group views is more adequate than a summative
account. This is the case in large collaborations where the group is under
pressure to publish novel and significant findings without waiting for all
the group members to arrive at a summative consensus via deliberation. I
have argued also that the moral and social values implicit in collective ac-
ceptance are extrinsic epistemic values because they promote the attainment
of truth by guaranteeing the internal consistency of collective views.
Since collective acceptance is a special case, there is a need to develop an
alternative, noncollective account of the epistemic structure of scientific
collaboration. For example, what Melinda Fagan (2011) calls an “interac-
tive” account of group views is a noncollective alternative both to a col-
lective acceptance and to a summative account of group views. On an in-
teractive account, the epistemic structure of scientific collaboration consists
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of relations of trust and other interactions among group members (Thagard
2010, 279; Fagan 2011, 251; Wagenknecht 2013, 207). In the next section
I argue that even if one prefers a trust-based account of group views to a
collective acceptance account, moral and social values can play a legitimate
role in acceptance. As in the case of collective acceptance, a particular moral
and social value is properly understood to be an extrinsic epistemic value.
5. Values in Trust-Based Acceptance. Trust plays an epistemic role in
science when trust in a testifier functions as a reason to accept an obser-
vation report, an experimental result, a background assumption, or some
other piece of information (Hardwig 1991; Kitcher 1993; Kusch 2002;
Wilholt 2013; Wagenknecht 2014). The main difference between collec-
tive and trust-based acceptance is that whereas in the former case scientific
knowledge is attributed to the group as a whole, in the latter case it is at-
tributed to individual group members. An individual group member’s set
of justified views is extended dramatically if trust in another group member
is seen as a sufficiently good ground for epistemic justification. Thus, trust
makes it possible for each group member to know more than she could
know otherwise.
As John Hardwig argues, trust in a testifier involves trust in the moral and
epistemic character of the testifier (1991, 700). When a scientist trusts a
testifier, she trusts that the testifier is honest in giving her testimony and
competent in the relevant domain. In an empirical study of two research
groups Susann Wagenknecht argues that scientists use various strategies to
secure trust in other group members (2014, 21). Scientists are not only
engaged in question-and-answer types of interactions; sometimes they also
witness the work of their collaborators in order to increase their under-
standing of others’ contributions. Yet, trust plays an irreducible role in ac-
ceptance because other group members do not know the details as well as
the person who is in charge of running an experiment (Wagenknecht 2014,
11–13). Next, I argue that while scientists often expect to have some em-
pirical warrant to support their trust in the epistemic character of their
collaborators, the moral character of their collaborators is often taken for
granted.
5.1. Default Assumption of Honesty. Honesty is often taken for granted
in scientific collaborations because evidence of moral character is incom-
plete. When group leaders recruit scientists into their teams, they may seek
evidence of the moral character of the candidate in letters of recommenda-
tion (Frost-Arnold 2013). Also, when scientists work in relatively small and
stable teams, they are likely to trust the moral character of other team mem-
bers because an extended experience of collaboration gives them a good
reason to do so (Wagenknecht 2014). But even when there is evidence of
good moral character, trust in the moral character of other team members
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is underdetermined by evidence. This is because the very notion of char-
acter refers to a disposition to behave in certain ways across a range of so-
cial situations. Consequently, trust in the moral character of other scientists
is at least partly based on a principle of charity.
The assumption of honesty plays an even more prominent role in large-
scale collaborations where scientists do not know all the other group mem-
bers personally. Being members in the same research group may be a reason
for one group member A to trust the moral character of an unknown group
member B if A believes that a third group member C whom A finds trust-
worthy knows B personally and has found B’s moral character flawless.
But even in this case, A’s trust in the moral character of B and C is based
on incomplete evidence.
The upshot is that honesty functions as a default assumption in trust-
based acceptance. To say that honesty is a default assumption means that
a testifier is assumed to be honest unless one has a reason to doubt it. Hav-
ing made a mistake is not yet a reason to doubt a scientist’s honesty since
many mistakes are due to oversight, lack of experience, or some other short-
coming in the scientist’s epistemic character. One has a reason to doubt some-
one’s honesty when there is evidence of intentional attempts to distort the
research process (or of gross negligence leading to such distortions). The de-
fault assumption of honesty is a moral value judgment because it is accepted
for a moral reason. The moral reason is the belief that it is morally wrong to
doubt another groupmember’s honesty when one does not have a reason to do
so. It follows that if acceptance is understood to include trust-based accep-
tance, then a moral value judgment can play a legitimate role in acceptance.
Also, the default assumption of honesty is an extrinsic epistemic value
because it contributes to epistemic justification in the context of scientific
collaboration. While honesty is not the only requirement for a person’s being
a trustworthy source of information, the assumption that a person is honest
in giving her testimony is one reason to consider her trustworthy. Given the
default assumption of honesty, trust in a testifier can be a good reason to accept
a piece of information when a person does not have first-hand evidence. In
scientific collaborations trust is often a superior reason to accept a piece of
information because it gives one access to the best available evidence. As
Hardwig (1991) explains, trust-based acceptance does not mean that evi-
dence does not matter in epistemic justification. Quite the contrary, trust-
based acceptance is needed precisely because evidence matters and it is too
extensive and complex to be had by any other means than by trusting others
(Hardwig 1991, 706). Next, I wish to reply to three objections that may be
raised against my argument.
5.2. Objections and Replies. The first objection is that reliance on
moral value judgments concerning honesty can be reduced if not eliminated
by designing reward systems and sanctions so that they provide scientists
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with a strong incentive to act in an honest way. When reward systems and
sanctions work well, a scientist has a nonmoral reason to trust another
scientist’s testimony. The nonmoral reason is her belief that the other sci-
entist is likely to act in an honest way because as a self-interested and
rational actor the other scientist understands that it is in her best interest to
do so. In what Karen Frost-Arnold (2013) calls a self-interest account of
trust, scientists trust each other’s testimony because they believe that sanc-
tions for betraying trust are so serious that it is in their best interest to be
trustworthy.
Against this objection I argue that while a self-interest account of trust
can give a partial explanation of why scientists trust each other in collab-
orations, it has limitations. As Hardwig points out, institutionalized control
mechanisms, such as replication of results, may diminish the need to rely on
the moral character of the testifier, but they cannot obviate it (1991, 707).
One reason for this is that replication is not always done because it may not
lead to a publication in a high-impact journal. Replication is also costly and
likely to delay other research projects. For example, randomized clinical
trials remain often what James R. Brown (2010) calls “one-shot” science.
Given that results are not always replicated, it may take a long time to
discover dishonesty. And if dishonesty is not detected, it will not be pun-
ished. For this reason it is unlikely that moral value judgments will be
eliminated from the evaluation of trustworthiness. As Hardwig explains it,
“There are no ‘people-proof’ institutions” (1991, 707). If Hardwig is right,
moral value judgments can legitimately play a role in the evaluation of
trustworthiness. This means that they can legitimately play a role in trust-
based acceptance.
The second objection to my argument is that the moral values implicit in
trust-based acceptance are so remotely related to the attainment of truth that
they do not deserve to be called epistemic values. Against this objection I
argue that it is based on a narrow definition of epistemic value that is in need
of further defense. Given a narrow definition, the set of epistemic values
includes merely intrinsic epistemic values, that is, values that are either in-
dicators of truth or necessary for truth (Steel 2010, 15). It does not include
extrinsic epistemic values, that is, values that promote the attainment of
truth without themselves being indicators or requirements of truth (Steel
2010, 18). Given the narrow definition, epistemic values can have a jus-
tification independently of scientists’ historical reliance on them (Doug-
las 2013, 801). Consequently, epistemic values can be identified indepen-
dently of scientific practices as they have evolved historically. While these
features may be attractive for some purposes in philosophy of science, I see
no reason to limit the scope of philosophical inquiry to intrinsic epistemic
values. Extrinsic epistemic values are not less interesting for those philos-
ophers who aim to understand actual scientific practices.
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As with the second objection, the third one is also concerned with the
definition of epistemic value. Someone may argue that a broad definition
of epistemic value, the one including not only intrinsic but also extrinsic
epistemic values, tends to blur the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction al-
together. If some moral and social values are extrinsic epistemic values, then
almost any values can be argued to be epistemic values, the objection goes.
But this is not the case. If the set of epistemic values includes extrinsic
epistemic values, then the epistemic/non-epistemic distinction is context
dependent because the effectiveness of extrinsic epistemic values in bring-
ing about the desired epistemic ends depends on the circumstances, and the
circumstances are likely to vary from one context to another (Steel 2010,
20). This means that it may be a demanding task to determine whether a
value is epistemic extrinsically. But it does not mean that we should aban-
don the distinction among epistemic and non-epistemic values.
To sum up the argument, some moral and social values deserve to be called
extrinsic epistemic values because in the context of scientific collaboration
they promote epistemic justification, either the justification of group views (as
I have argued in sec. 4) or the justification of individual views that are based on
testimony (as I have argued in sec. 5). This result adds a novel dimension to
the three normative approaches I have reviewed in section 3. Moral and social
values are allowed to play a role in acceptance not only because they are re-
quired by moral responsibility (Douglas 2009) or because they can generate
diversity and critical perspectives (Longino 1990; Solomon 2001). Somemoral
and social values should be permitted to play a role in acceptance because they
are woven into the epistemic fabric of scientific collaboration.
6. Conclusion. The debate on the proper role of values in acceptance has
been limited so far because it has focused either on individual scientists’
decision making independently of scientific collaborations or on the proper
functioning of scientific communities. In order to reveal the limitations, I
have reviewed three arguments against the value-free ideal and three al-
ternatives to the value-free ideal. In each case a research team is treated as
an epistemic black box, and the epistemic significance of its inner organi-
zation is overlooked.
In order to explain the group perspective on values in science, I have
introduced the notions of collective acceptance and trust-based acceptance.
In the case of collective acceptance the group perspective means that the
group is the agent of acceptance, whereas in the case of trust-based ac-
ceptance it means that an individual group member is epistemically de-
pendent on other group members. Most significantly, the group perspective
challenges the assumption that all moral and social values are non-epistemic
values. In the case of collective acceptance, a joint commitment to collab-
oration generates moral and social obligations that can play a legitimate role
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in acceptance. In the case of trust-based acceptance, a default assumption of
honesty is a moral value judgment that can play a legitimate role in accep-
tance. In both cases, moral and social values are extrinsic epistemic values
because they promote the epistemic justification of either group views or
individual views in the context of epistemic dependency. Some values are
moral, social, and epistemic at the same time.
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